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Notes
PENNIES FROM HEAVEN OR EXCESSIVE FINES FROM HELL?
COMMONWEALTH v. 1997 CHEVROLET KEEPS CIVIL ASSET
FORFEITURE’S THREAT TO HOMEOWNERSHIP
IN PURGATORY
LYDIA E. ELLSWORTH*
“Housing is absolutely essential to human flourishing.
Without stable shelter, it all falls apart.”1
I. THE LORD GIVETH AND THE GOVERNMENT TAKETH AWAY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL IN REM FORFEITURE
Eight boxes, a partially assembled drag racer, fifteen impounded cats,
and a moon rock—a motley assortment of items if ever one existed.2  Yet,
these seemingly dissimilar objects have a unifying characteristic: each of
them has been named as a defendant in a civil lawsuit.3  Although it is
often remarked that America is becoming increasingly litigious, most
Americans might be surprised to learn that even inanimate objects can be
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A. 2016, Messiah College.  This Note is dedicated to my loving parents, William
and Amy Ellsworth, as well as my late grandmothers, Lydia Postupak Hirner and
Marie Ellsworth, and my biggest supporter, Mitchell Rock.  I would also like to
thank all members of the Villanova Law Review who assisted me in the writing and
publication of this Note and professors past and present who have inspired me
along the way.
1. Kevin Nance, Matthew Desmond’s “Evicted” Details Cost of Evictions on Milwau-
kee’s Poor, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 10, 2016, 10:22 AM) http://www.chicagotribune.com/
lifestyles/books/ct-prj-evicted-matthew-desmond-20160310-story.html [https://per
ma.cc/XJ5F-L3AA] (quoting from interview with sociologist and author Matthew
Desmond).
2. See, e.g., United States v. One Partially Assembled Drag Racer, 107 F.3d 864,
864 (3d Cir. 1997) (Table) (granting drag racer owner’s motion for return of
property and dismissal of complaint after federal government seized drag racer
without filing sufficient complaint); United States v. Eight Boxes Containing Vari-
ous Articles of Misc. Merch., 105 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1939) (denying bankruptcy
trustee’s petition to intervene in civil forfeiture suit where trustee’s debtor illegally
smuggled eight boxes of miscellaneous items into United States); United States v.
One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369, 1381
(S.D. Fla. 2003) (finding that stolen moon rock and plaque gifted to Honduras by
United States were subject to forfeiture); South Dakota v. Fifteen Impounded Cats,
785 N.W.2d 272, 280 (S.D. 2010) (affirming warrantless impoundment of cats be-
longing to woman living in car).
3. See supra note 2; see also In rem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed., 2014)
(“against a thing”); Stefan D. Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in the United
States, 17 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 347, 357 (2007) (explaining that civil forfeitures are
proceedings in rem, meaning action is filed “against property itself”).
(125)
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sued.4  Of course, this is only possible for certain types of in rem proceed-
ings, one of which is known as civil asset forfeiture.5  Pursuant to federal
and state law, respective governments can initiate civil proceedings against
a piece of real or personal property as itself, rather than its owner or occu-
pant, after determining the property’s involvement in criminal activity.6
Across the United States, federal and local law enforcement agencies
collectively amass billions of dollars by seizing property deemed to be an
instrumentality of illegal activity.7  In Pennsylvania alone, citizens have for-
feited over $100 million worth of private property to state law enforce-
ment.8  Described by one officer as “pennies from heaven,” the funds
derived from seizures of real and personal property contribute to the
budgets of state government agencies.9  This is especially true for the City
4. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, Explaining American Litigiousness: A Product of Politics,
Not Just Law, AM. L. & ECON. ASS’N ANN. MEETINGS, 2005, at 1, 5 (acknowledging
and tracing roots of America’s overly-litigious reputation); Christopher Danzig, In-
fographic of the Day: American Litigiousness Statistics That Will Make You Angry, ABOVE
THE L. (July 17, 2012, 03:51 PM) https://abovethelaw.com/2012/07/infographic-
of-the-day-american-litigiousness-statistics-that-will-make-you-angry/ [https://
perma.cc/6Z2G-8GY6] (comparing frequency of litigation in United States to
other developed nations); Randye Hoder, It’s Not Your Old Camp: Too Many Law-
suits, Too Few Hugs, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014, 05:04 PM) http://
www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-hoder-hugs-20140827-story.html [https://
perma.cc/LY2Y-Q5S2] (arguing that America’s “litigious, hypersensitive, media-
driven world” places unnecessary restrictions on social interactions).
5. See, e.g., 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN § 5805(a) (West 2018) (“The
proceedings for the forfeiture or condemnation of property . . . shall be in rem, in
which the Commonwealth shall be the plaintiff and the property the defendant.”).
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY2016 ASSET FORFEITURE FUND REPORTS TO CON-
GRESS, https://www.justice.gov/afp/fy2016-asset-forfeiture-fund-reports-congress
[https://perma.cc/5NW5-8PGM] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018) (summarizing property
seized through federal civil asset forfeiture program).
6. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (2012) (listing property subject to forfeiture under
federal law); see also 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5802–03 (describing
applicability of Pennsylvania’s forfeiture law).
7. See, e.g., Matt Ford, The Bipartisan Opposition to Sessions’s New Civil Forfeiture
Rules, ATLANTIC (July 19, 2017) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/07/sessions-forfeiture-justice-department-civil/534168/ [https://perma.cc/
T2PE-FKCF] (providing overview of modern civil forfeiture practice); INST. FOR
JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE, http://
ij.org/report/policing-for-profit/introduction/ [https://perma.cc/4WM3-BDAG]
(last visited Sept. 4, 2017) (presenting findings showing nearly $29 billion in forfei-
ture deposits from 2001 to 2014).
8. See Civil Asset Forfeiture, ACLU OF PA. https://www.aclupa.org/issues/forfei-
ture/ [https://perma.cc/TJ8D-RND4] (last visited Aug. 24, 2017) (providing brief
explanation of civil forfeiture procedure and practice in Pennsylvania).
9. See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Civil Forfeiture (HBO television broad-
cast Oct. 5, 2014) (providing expose´ of civil forfeiture practice in United States,
including clip of Missouri police chief explaining that civil forfeiture funds are
“kinda like pennies from heaven”).  Philadelphia’s reputation of aggressive civil
forfeiture implementation is widely known. See, e.g., ACLU OF PA., GUILTY PROP-
ERTY: HOW LAW ENFORCEMENT TAKES $1 MILLION IN CASH FROM INNOCENT PHI-
LADELPHIANS EVERY YEAR—AND GETS AWAY WITH IT 3 (June 2015), https://
www.aclupa.org/files/3214/3326/0426/Guilty_Property_Report_-_FINAL.pdf
2
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of Philadelphia, which has earned itself a nationwide reputation of aggres-
sively employing civil forfeiture as a means to expand its own law enforce-
ment budget.10
In Philadelphia and other metropolitan areas, civil forfeiture is in-
creasingly used as a weapon in the war on drugs.11  That is, the practice is
purported to benefit communities plagued with crime by depriving drug
dealers of resources and profits, while also deterring further instances of
crime.12  Lurking in the background of these policies, however, is a steady
increase in homelessness and housing instability among the very commu-
[https://perma.cc/5VFG-67VF] (detailing allocation of funds amassed through
civil forfeiture of property in Philadelphia); Philadelphia Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUS-
TICE, http://ij.org/case/philadelphia-forfeiture/ [https://perma.cc/3K43-JQHR]
(last visited Sept. 16, 2017) (describing Philadelphia’s “Civil Forfeiture Machine”);
see also Rich Zeoli, Attorney: Philadelphia Is “Ground Zero” for Civil Asset Forfeiture, CBS
PHILLY (Feb. 28, 2017, 06:40 PM), http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2017/02/28/
attorney-philadelphia-ground-zero-forfeiture/ [https://perma.cc/448S-YJTD] (re-
porting that attorney for Institute of Justice characterized Philadelphia as worst
abuser of civil asset forfeiture in United States).
10. See, e.g., Radley Balko, Philadelphia Family Loses Home over a Single Drug
Charge, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 10, 2013, 11:03 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2013/09/10/philadelphia-family-loses_n_3899905.html [https://perma.cc/
FV6Q-Z6JQ] (describing plight of Philadelphia family evicted during civil forfei-
ture proceedings, then lost home to mortgage foreclosure after district attorney
withdrew claim); Pamela Brown, Parents’ House Seized After Son’s Drug Bust, CNN
(Sept. 8, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/03/us/philadelphia-
drug-bust-house-seizure/index.html [https://perma.cc/3PNK-2ZS4] (reporting
suburban Philadelphia parents’ feelings of violation and devastation after being
removed from home as a result of son’s drug-related activities); see also KATHLEEN
G. KANE, COMMNW. OF PA. OFFICE ATT’Y GEN., ASSET FORFEITURE REPORT, 12, 57–58
(2015), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3897504-Asset-Forfeiture-
Report-2014-2015-Controlled.html [https://perma.cc/A8BS-RUFG] (reporting
uses of funds amassed through civil forfeiture proceedings and listing total income
from Philadelphia county forfeitures at $2,203,272.00 for 2014 fiscal year, while
next largest county, Allegheny, amassed $1,080,535.33, and rural Perry County
only amassed $432.80); COMMNW. OF PA. OFFICE ATT’Y GEN., PHILADELPHIA ASSET
FORFEITURE REPORT: FY 2007–10, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
746105-asset-forfeiture-phila-07-08-1-merged [https://perma.cc/BB4J-CTKF] (last
visited Jan. 8, 2018) (listing total income from forfeitures at $4,671,276.00,
$6,220,560.00, and $5,971,380.00 for years 2007 through 2010, respectively).
11. See John L. Worrall, Addicted to the Drug War: The Role of Civil Asset Forfeiture
As a Budgetary Necessity in Contemporary Law Enforcement, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 171, 171
(2001) (“[Civil forfeiture] is largely designed to weaken the economic foundations
of the illicit drug trade and assist law enforcement in reducing drug-related crime”
(internal citations omitted)).  For examples of civil forfeiture proceedings absent
drug-related activity, see Stefan D. Cassella & David B. Smith, The Role of Civil Forfei-
ture, 100 JUDICATURE, no. 4, 2016, at 68–69 (arguing civil forfeiture’s utility in
crimes related to terrorism, intellectual property violation, money laundering, and
other international crimes).
12. See, e.g., Joel Mathis, What Seth Williams Didn’t Say About Civil Forfeiture,
PHILA. MAG. (Mar. 4, 2015, 05:30 AM) http://www.phillymag.com/news/2015/
03/04/seth-williams-civil-forfeiture-inquirer-oped/ [https://perma.cc/K6T3-
33WX] (critiquing former district attorney Seth Williams’s public stance on civil
forfeiture).
3
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nities that have been targets in this war.13  Although Philadelphia has at-
tempted to mitigate its climbing rates of homelessness and housing
instability, it continues to use civil asset forfeiture as a tool to seize low-
income family residences indiscriminately.14  As its use continues, courts
are increasingly faced with arguments that the practice of civil in rem for-
feiture is unconstitutional on a variety of grounds, one of these being that
it violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines.15
In Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized from James Young,16
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania contemplated the extent to which civil
in rem forfeitures implicate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
excessive fines.17  The court, failing to carve out a specific exception for
residential properties, confirmed a two-prong test for determining the
constitutionality of a forfeiture: first, whether the property was an instru-
mentality of a crime, and second, whether the value of the property is
“grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense.”18  Importantly, the
court also delineated specific factors to be considered when conducting its
13. See, e.g., John Kopp, Philly Mayor: Don’t Give Cash to Panhandlers, PHIL-
LYVOICE (June 12, 2017) http://www.phillyvoice.com/philly-officials-launch-fund
raiser-combat-increased-panhandling/ [https://perma.cc/44CS-8DQJ] (noting
that “[t]he number of panhandlers on Philadelphia’s streets is increasing, a trend
that city officials believe is a byproduct of the opioid crisis”); see also City of Phila.,
Mayor’s Task Force on Eviction Preparation and Response, Draft Report and Rec-
ommendations 4 (Apr. 16, 2018), http://www.phila.gov/hhs/PDF/Draft%20evic
tion%20Task%20Force%20Report%2004%2016%2018.pdf [https://perma.cc.23
TU-JTKN] (reporting that “Philadelphia is currently suffering from an eviction cri-
sis”); State Data and Contacts Map, U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS,
https://www.usich.gov/tools-for-action/map/#fn[]=1400&fn[]=3100&fn[]=6300&
fn[]=10400&fn[]=13200&all_types=true&year=2016&state=PA [https://perma.cc/
6LBH-PENL] (last visited Sept. 4, 2017) (listing Pennsylvania’s total homeless pop-
ulation at 15,339 as of 2016).
14. See, e.g., Press Release, City of Phila., City Announces Texting as a Way for
People to Support the Homeless (June 12, 2017), https://beta.phila.gov/press-re
leases/mayor/city-announces-texting-as-a-way-for-people-to-support-the-homeless/
[https://perma.cc/N8VQ-6QLP] (describing Philadelphia mayor’s texting dona-
tion program, which allows individuals to text “Share” to designated number to
make five dollar contribution, which is then matched by Philadelphia and donated
to local programs that provide housing and other services to city’s homeless
population).
15. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed . . . .”). See generally Susan R. Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture
and Double Jeopardy, 82 IOWA L. REV. 183 (1996) (providing overview of the conver-
gence of the Double Jeopardy Clause and civil forfeiture laws); Matthew A. Martel,
Bennis v. Michigan: Forfeiting the Family Car Under Public Nuisance Laws, 47 CATH.
U.L. REV. 283 (1997) (examining due process implications of civil forfeiture
adjudication).
16. 160 A.3d 153 (Pa. 2017).
17. For a further analysis of the Pennsylvania supreme court’s decision in
1997 Chevrolet, see infra notes 89–110 and accompanying text.
18. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 159 (promulgating a two-part excessive fine
test).  The case was on appeal from the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania,
which had reversed and remanded the Philadelphia County Court of Common
Pleas’ decision granting forfeiture. See id. at 162. See generally Commonwealth v.
4
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prescribed analysis, something the United States Supreme Court has yet to
do.19
This Note analyzes the factors laid out in 1997 Chevrolet in the context
of drug-related forfeitures of single-family homes and advocates for a cate-
gorical presumption of excessiveness in such cases.20  Part II provides in-
formation regarding the historical roots and current implementation of
asset forfeiture.21  Part III provides the facts and procedure of 1997 Chevro-
let.22  Part IV analyzes the court’s reasoning in deciding 1997 Chevrolet.23
Part V provides a critical analysis of the court’s reasoning and highlights
the shortcomings of the two-step, multifactor approach to the excessive
fine analysis.24  Finally, Part VI discusses the potential impact of this
decision.25
II. BACKGROUND: THE NATIVITY OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE
Undoubtedly, civil asset forfeiture is conceptually foreign to most.26
This practice, however, is neither novel nor infrequent in the United
States or abroad.27  An historical analysis of in rem forfeiture reveals that
its roots are both deep and far-reaching, spanning from biblical times to
the war on drugs.28
1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d 836 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014), aff’d, 160 A.3d 153 (Pa.
2017).
19. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 191–92 (summarizing list of factors to be
considered when performing excessive fines analysis); infra note 100 and accompa-
nying text for list of factors considered by the 1997 Chevrolet court; see also infra
note 64 and accompanying text explaining that the Supreme Court’s most recent
civil forfeiture case did not identify factors for lower courts to consider.
20. For a complete argument in favor of a presumption of excessiveness in
cases of drug-related residential forfeitures, see infra notes 111–53 and accompany-
ing text.
21. For a further discussion of the history and development of civil asset for-
feiture practice, see infra notes 26–42 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the facts of 1997 Chevrolet, see infra notes 70–88
and accompanying text.
23. For a complete narrative analysis of the 1997 Chevrolet court’s decision, see
infra notes 89–110 and accompanying text.
24. For a complete critical analysis of the 1997 Chevrolet court’s decision, see
infra notes 111–66 and accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion of the impact of 1997 Chevrolet, see infra notes
166–75 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Cassella & Smith, supra note 11, at 73 (remarking that “civil forfei-
ture is too complicated for a nonlawyer to understand.  Indeed, it is difficult to
find a lawyer who really understands it.”).
27. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274 (1996) (“Since the earliest
years of this Nation, Congress has authorized the Government to seek . . . in rem
civil forfeiture actions . . . .”); see also CIVIL FORFEITURE OF CRIMINAL PROPERTY:
LEGAL MEASURES FOR TARGETING THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME 52–249 (Simon N.M.
Young ed., 2009) (providing overviews of civil forfeiture laws in Ireland, South
Africa, Australia, Canada, and United Kingdom).
28. For a further explanation of civil forfeiture’s history, see infra notes 29–42
and accompanying text.
5
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A. Biblical Origins and Colonial Resurrection
Scholars remark that the general concept of civil forfeiture can be
traced back to the Old Testament.29  Specifically, those who study civil
forfeiture’s history point to the Book of Exodus, which instructs that when
an ox gores a person to death, the ox is to be killed, but its owner escapes
liability.30  The guilt of the ox itself seems to be the first recorded instance
of “guilty property”—the legal fiction upon which civil forfeiture is
based.31  The concept of guilty property lived on and infused itself into
English common law in the form of the “deodand,” or the term used for a
forfeiture to the king absent a criminal conviction.32  When an inanimate
object caused the death of one of the king’s subjects, that object became a
deodand and was forfeited to the crown, and its value was to be used for
charitable purposes.33
Given its common law roots, civil forfeiture was poised to be brought
to America upon colonization.34  However, this type of forfeiture was so
29. See, e.g., David R. Fine & Raymond P. Pepe, Bennis v. Michigan and Inno-
cent Owners in Civil Forfeiture: Balancing Legitimate Goals with Due Process and Reasona-
ble Expectations, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 595, 598 (1996) (including provisions from
Old Testament and Roman law related to concept of guilty property); Tom
Gordon, Civil Asset Forfeiture: Procedural and Economic Inequities, 55 GUILD PRAC. 188,
188 (1998) (noting that concept of civil in rem forfeiture “dates back to the Old
Testament”); David Benjamin Ross, “Comment & Note” Civil Forfeiture: A Fiction
That Offends Due Process, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 259, 260 (citing biblical law as source
contributing to concept of guilty property).
30. See Exodus 21:28; see also Anthony J. Franze, Note, Casualties of War?: Drugs,
Civil Forfeiture, and the Plight of the “Innocent Owner”, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 369,
373 (1994) (recognizing biblical roots of civil forfeiture); Alice Marie O’Brien,
Note, Caught in the Crossfire: Protecting the Innocent Owner of Real Property from Civil
Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(7), 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 521, 524 (1991) (noting
that practice of forfeiture dates back to biblical era and is recorded in ancient
Grecian and Roman manuscripts).
31. See United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 1996)
(noting that “[s]ome trace the roots of civil forfeiture to the Old Testament”); see
also Michael van den Berg, Comment, Proposing a Transaction Approach to Civil Forfei-
ture Reform, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 867, 873 (2015) (stating that concept of “guilty”
property, derived from Old Testament, is core of civil forfeiture).
32. See Calero v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680–82 (1974) (ex-
plaining that deodand served dual purpose of religious expiation and penalization
for carelessness); see also Tamara R. Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth: How the Expan-
sion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911,
929–30 (1991) (explaining that among the theories justifying deodand are relig-
ious cleansing, prevention of vigilante justice, and punishment for negligence).
33. See Calero, 416 U.S. at 681 (“The value of the instrument was forfeited to
the King, in the belief that the King would provide the money for Masses to be said
for the good of the dead man’s soul, or insure[sic] that the deodand was put to
charitable uses.”). But see Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture
and the War on Drugs: Lessons from Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 94
(1996) (“In theory, the Crown used the funds form the liquidated deodand to pay
for the funeral Mass of the deceased.  In time, however, the Crown actually prof-
ited from deodand.”).
34. See 427 & 429 Hall St, 74 F.3d at 1168 (stating that “only statutory forfei-
ture,” rather than deodand, “became part of the American legal tradition”); see also
6
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unpopular among the colonists that it was generally used as a tool to seize
property only in situations where a criminal conviction was impractical.35
It was not until Prohibition that state and federal governments began
utilizing civil forfeiture as a means to combat domestic criminal
enterprises.36
B. The War on Drugs: Civil Forfeiture’s Second Coming
After a period of dormancy following the end of Prohibition, Con-
gress revived civil forfeiture in 1970 as one of its weapons in the war on
drugs.37  The intent behind authorizing civil forfeiture for drug-related
crimes was to economically cripple, deter, and punish those involved in
the “enormously profitable” drug trade.38  States soon followed suit by en-
Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446, 2457–58
(2016) (explaining that during colonial era, English Parliament used forfeiture
laws as means to encourage statutory compliance); van den Berg, supra note 31, at
873–75 (noting that although deodand was excised from English common law dur-
ing early eighteenth century, statutory forfeiture law remained in practice through-
out Revolutionary Era).
35. See Brent Skorup, Comment, Ensuring Eighth Amendment Protection from Ex-
cessive Fines in Civil Asset Forfeiture Cases, 22 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 427, 433
(1994) (stating that despite founding fathers’ disdain toward civil forfeiture, prac-
tice remained on books due to its utility in rare cases of piracy and other maritime
situations); see also  Brant C. Hadaway, Comment, Executive Privateers: A Discussion
on Why the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act Will Not Significantly Reform the Practice of
Forfeiture, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 81, 84 (2000) (explaining that “forfeiture was a
hated measure among the colonists” but “remained a tool, however, in certain
matters involving the collection of revenue and at admiralty”).
36. See National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 316 (1919) (repealed
1933) (prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors); Skorup, supra note 35, at 433
(“When Prohibition began in the first half of the twentieth century, use of civil
forfeiture reemerged and was expanded to combat criminal bootlegging net-
works.”); see also Rickman v. Kentucky,  265 S.W. 452, 454 (Ky. 1924) (reversing and
remanding forfeiture of 155-acre farm which contained still used to produce li-
quor).  In Rickman, state law provided that:
Any person, firm or corporation, knowingly or intentionally renting, hir-
ing, letting or lending or leasing or permitting the use of, or using any
building, house, structure, or premises, farm or part thereof, real estate
or part thereof, or any boat or other water craft or air craft, or any car,
truck, wagon or team, automobile or propelling the same for the purpose
of the unlawful manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating li-
quors, to another or others, shall be considered guilty of a nuisance and
of a violation of this act, and any property so used in violation of this act
shall become forfeited to the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Id. at 452 (quoting 1922 KY. ACTS 114).  Despite the applicable forfeiture statute,
the court found the forfeiture of the entire farm improper and instructed the for-
feiture of only the discrete property used to produce alcohol. See id. at 454.
37. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(f)) (allowing
forfeiture of controlled substances and all property which is used to facilitate a
violation of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act).
38. See Klein, supra note 15, at 208–09; see also Robin Sackett, Comment, The
Impact of Austin v. United States: Extending Constitutional Protections to Claimants in
Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 495, 502 (1994) (explaining
7
Ellsworth: Pennies from Heaven or Excessive Fines from Hell? Commonwealth v.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
132 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 125
acting analogous statutes, such as Pennsylvania’s Controlled Substances,
Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act (Controlled Substances Act).39  When the
federal legislation was first enacted, the assets and proceeds collected from
forfeitures were deposited into the U.S. Treasury’s general fund, meaning
they would go towards financing “the daily and long-term operations of
the U.S. government as a whole.”40  However, Congress amended the Act
in 1984, allowing such funds to go directly to local law enforcement agen-
cies.41  This amendment once again prompted states to enact similar pro-
visions; Pennsylvania now allows the Commonwealth’s attorney general to
retain the property forfeited for official use or sell such property and use
the cash proceeds for the enforcement of the Controlled Substances
Act.42
C. Evolving Standards: Current Implementation of Civil Forfeiture
Civil forfeiture in Pennsylvania is currently governed by a recently
amended statute.43  Under the current legal framework, police first make
legislative history of Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act and its renewed use
of civil forfeiture).
39. See Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 1972 Pa. Laws.
233 (codified at 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 780-101–44).
40. Gen. Fund of the U.S. Gov’t, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsservices/gov/acctg/genFund/
genFund_home.htm [https://perma.cc/7QKV-DTWK] (last updated June 9,
2016). See also Barclay Thomas Johnson, Note, Restoring Civility—the Civil Asset For-
feiture Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35
IND. L. REV. 1045, 1050 (2001) (discussing the evolution of civil asset forfeiture
procedure and explaining that prior to 1984 assets seized through forfeiture were
“deposited into the U.S. Treasury’s general funds”).
41. See id. (positing that allowing proceeds to be deposited into special forfei-
ture funds represented important shift in civil forfeiture procedure); see also Hada-
way, supra note 35 at 84 (describing 1984 amendments to Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act which gave Attorney General full control over funds from for-
feited assets).
42. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5803(f)–(g) (West 2018) (allocat-
ing proceeds of forfeiture actions); see also KANE, supra note 10 (reporting that
$2,222,172.00 of state’s expenditures during fiscal year 2014 were acquired
through asset forfeiture); CRIM. L. DIV., ASSET FORFEITURE & MONEY LAUNDERING,
COMMW. OF PA. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/crimi-
nal-law-division/ [https://perma.cc/5TZ4-CFEK] (providing attorney general’s as-
set forfeiture practice).  In relevant part, the attorney general’s website states:
an aggressive approach to the investigation and presentation/prosecu-
tion of asset forfeiture and money laundering cases has led to significant
forfeitures of monies, automobiles, personal property and real estates . . .
[t]he monies derived from the forfeitures are, in turn, used by law en-
forcement to help future drug and other criminal investigations as well as
assist community-based drug crime-fighting program throughout the
state
Id.
43. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5805; see also Press Release, Gover-
nor Tom Wolf, Governor Wolf Signs Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Bill into Law
(June 29, 2017), https://www.governor.pa.gov/governor-wolf-signs-civil-asset-for-
feiture-reform-bill-into-law/ [https://perma.cc/P8FJ-TL5P] (publicizing passing
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a determination that the property is being used or is intended to be used
to facilitate a violation of the Controlled Substances Act.44  Then, the
Commonwealth can initiate legal proceedings by filing a forfeiture peti-
tion in the appropriate court of common pleas where the property is lo-
cated, naming the property as defendant.45  Upon being served with
notice of the petition, the property owner or occupant, who now becomes
the claimant, has thirty days to file an answer.46  Regardless of whether a
claimant has filed an answer, the property may be seized once the claim-
ant has been served with process.47  However, the claimant may file a mo-
tion seeking release of the property pending the conclusion of the
proceedings if he or she can prove that seizure would cause a substantial
hardship.48
If the claimant files an answer within the allotted thirty-day period, a
trial commences.49  Importantly, because this is a civil proceeding, the
property owner does not have the right to counsel at any point during the
trial.50  As the plaintiff, the Commonwealth must show by clear and con-
of new civil forfeiture statute which raises burden of proof for Commonwealth and
prohibits “pre-forfeiture seizure of real property without a hearing”).
44. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5803(b)(4) (“Property subject to
forfeiture may be seized by a law enforcement authority if . . . [t]here is probable
cause to believe that the property has been used or is intended to be used in viola-
tion of the act of . . . The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or
another offense for which forfeiture is expressly authorized as a sanction.”); see
United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1119 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that vehicle
was subject to forfeiture because police had probable cause to believe that defen-
dant’s use of vehicle made drug transaction less difficult).
45. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5805(a) (“The proceedings for
the forfeiture or condemnation of property, the sale of which is provided for in
this chapter, shall be in rem, in which the Commonwealth shall be the plaintiff
and the property the defendant.”).
46. See id. § 5805(a)(2)(i) (describing process of filing answer to petition of
forfeiture).
47. See id. § 5805(b)(1) (“A copy of the forfeiture petition required under
subsection (a) shall be served personally or by certified mail on the owner, if
known, and on each person in possession at the time of the seizure, if known.”).
48. See id. § 5805(f)(1)(iii) (“A claimant to property subject to forfeiture is
permitted to seek the immediate release of seized property if . . . the continued
possession by the Commonwealth pending the final disposition of forfeiture pro-
ceedings will cause substantial hardship to the claimant, such as preventing the
functioning of a legitimate business, preventing the claimant from working or leav-
ing the claimant homeless.” (emphasis added)).
49. See id. § 5805(i) (prohibiting judicial district from requiring parties “to
proceed through local rules of arbitration”); see also id. § 5805(a)(2)(i) (“A claim-
ant shall file an answer setting forth a right of possession of the property within 30
days.”).
50. See Commonwealth v. $9,847.00 United States Currency, 704 A.2d 612,
617 (Pa. 1997) (“Because a claimant in a civil forfeiture proceeding is not in dan-
ger of a loss of personal liberty should he be unsuccessful at trial, we now hold that
there is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel for indigent claim-
ants in civil forfeiture matters under either[sic] the United States Constitution.”);
cf. 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1)(A) (2012) (granting right to appointed counsel to indi-
gent property owners in instances where owner is already represented in con-
9
Ellsworth: Pennies from Heaven or Excessive Fines from Hell? Commonwealth v.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
134 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 125
vincing evidence that the property was used in contradiction of the Con-
trolled Substances Act.51  The claimant, litigating pro se or with the aid of
counsel, may raise the “innocent owner defense” by claiming that he or
she did not have knowledge or give consent to the illegal activity.52
Once raised, the burden remains with the Commonwealth to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the claimant in fact knew about and
consented to the property’s illicit use.53  If the Commonwealth is success-
ful in proving both the owner’s knowledge and consent, the court may
grant permanent forfeiture of the property.54  After the court determines
that forfeiture is appropriate, but prior to entry of the order, the owner
can “petition the court to determine whether the forfeiture is constitution-
ally excessive.”55  If the court finds that the forfeiture is grossly dispropor-
nected criminal case or forfeiture is of real property being used by owner as
primary residence).
51. See 2017 Pa. Laws 247 (codified as amended at 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5805(j)(3)) (holding Commonwealth to clear and convincing standard of
proof).  The statute now requires the Commonwealth to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that property is subject to forfeiture, rather than the former and
less-burdensome preponderance of the evidence standard. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. One 1988 Ford Coupe, 574 A.2d 631, 327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“At that
hearing, the Commonwealth must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the property in question was used to facilitate the drug transaction.” (citations
omitted)).  Given the recently heightened burden of proof, Pennsylvania case law
applying the clear and convincing standard is sparse. But see In re King Props., 635
A.2d 128, 133 (Pa. 1993).  In this case, the court affirmed the forfeiture of a crimi-
nal defendant’s home where clear and convincing evidence showed that the owner
used the property to further his ongoing drug trade. See id.  Large amounts of
cash, drugs, and drug paraphernalia found in the home were sufficient to establish
a “significant connection” between the criminal conduct and the property for-
feited. See id. (internal quotation omitted); see also Cohen v. a 1999 Pontiac, 976
N.Y.S.2d 782, 782 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (finding that county failed to produce clear and
convincing evidence that noncriminal defendant was involved in affirmative acts
which aided, abetted, or facilitated conduct of criminal defendant, as required by
New York law, where vehicle owner allowed another to operate her vehicle while
under influence alcohol or drugs).
52. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN § 5805(j)(4) (providing that if Com-
monwealth succeeds in establishing by clear and convincing evidence that prop-
erty is subject to forfeiture and claimant alleges that he or she did not have
knowledge of or consent to illegal use of property, then Commonwealth must es-
tablish by clear and convincing evidence that property was either used unlawfully
by claimant or was used by someone other than claimant with his or her “knowl-
edge and consent” (emphasis added)); Commonwealth v. 5900 Market St., 732
A.2d 659, 662 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (providing that the “innocent owner de-
fense” can be proven if the claimant shows “the property was not unlawfully used
or possessed by him”).
53. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5805(j)(4) (explaining that if
claimant puts forth innocent owner defense, the Commonwealth must rebut it
with clear and convincing evidence).
54. See id. § 5805(a) (describing general civil forfeiture procedure).
55. See id. § 5805(k)(1).  For a further discussion of how courts are to deter-
mine whether forfeiture is excessive under Eighth Amendment, see infra notes
89–110 and accompanying text.
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tional to the value of the property, the forfeiture must be eliminated or
reduced.56
Even before Pennsylvania’s civil forfeiture statute was amended to re-
flect a proportionality requirement, however, the United States and Penn-
sylvania supreme courts held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against excessive fines required a proportionality analysis in cases of civil
forfeiture.57  First, in United States v. Austin,58 the U.S. Supreme Court de-
cided that in rem forfeitures, although civil in nature, are nonetheless pu-
nitive and therefore subject to Eighth Amendment restrictions.59  Next,
the Supreme Court revisited the issue of excessive fines in United States v.
Bajakajian,60 where it considered the constitutionality of a forfeiture of
$357,144 in United States currency because the claimant violated a federal
statute that required him to report that he was traveling with more than
$10,000 in cash.61
Building off of Austin, the Bajakajian Court adopted a gross propor-
tionality standard for considering whether a forfeiture is constitutionally
excessive.62  That is, a forfeiture is excessive under the Eighth Amend-
ment where the “amount” of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to
the gravity of the underlying offense.63  Although the Court did not in-
struct the lower courts to consider any particular factors when making this
56. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN § 5805(k)(2) (“If the court finds
that the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the offense, the court shall reduce
or eliminate the forfeiture as necessary to avoid a constitutional violation.”).  For a
further discussion of what constitutes gross disproportionality, see infra notes
101–11 and accompanying text.
57. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (“The touchstone
of the constitutionality inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of
proportionality: The amount of a forfeiture must bear some relationship to the
gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.”); see also Commonwealth v.
5444 Spruce Street, 832 A.2d 396, 401–03 (Pa. 2003) (adopting the Bajakajian
Court’s definition of proportionality and requiring a gross disproportionality test
in all cases of punitive forfeiture).  For a further discussion of the courts’ applica-
tion of the proportionality test, see infra notes 111–40.
58. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
59. See id. at 622 (concluding that in light of relevant legislative history and
current statutory scheme, civil forfeitures serve to punish wrongdoers).  Although
the Austin Court remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit to determine whether
the forfeiture of the claimant’s auto body shop was excessive, it declined to estab-
lish a multifactor test for determining whether a civil forfeiture is constitutionally
excessive. See id. (“Austin asks that we establish a multifactor test for determining
whether a forfeiture is constitutionally ‘excessive.’  We decline that invitation.” (ci-
tation omitted)).
60. 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
61. See id. at 324–25 (describing the underlying criminal offense at issue).
62. See id. at 336 (reasoning that because “any judicial determination regard-
ing the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise,” a stan-
dard of gross proportionality is preferable to one of strict proportionality).
63. See id. at 336–37 (instructing courts to apply gross proportionality stan-
dard in cases of forfeiture).  In Bajakajian, the Court applied this standard and
found that the forfeiture of the claimant’s entire $357,144 was grossly dispropor-
tional to his crime of failing to report the currency. See id. at 337.
11
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determination, it considered the offense’s lack of relation to other illegal
activities, that the claimant did not fit into the class of persons for which
the statute was designed, and the minimal harm caused by the offense,
which all supported a finding of excessiveness.64
After the Court decided both Austin and Bajakajian, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania faced an analogous Eighth Amendment issue in
Commonwealth v. 5444 Spruce Street,65 where the claimant contested the con-
stitutionality of the forfeiture of her longtime Philadelphia home.66  The
underlying offense in 5444 Spruce Street was the owner’s single charge of
possession with intent to deliver, to which she pleaded guilty and received
a sentence of two years’ probation.67  In assessing the owner’s excessive
fine claim, the court confirmed that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines Clause applied to civil in rem forfeitures and adopted the gross dis-
proportionality test espoused in Bajakajian.68  Although the lower court
had claimed to have been applying Bajakajian in its decision upholding
the forfeiture, the 5444 Spruce Street court remanded because the record
contained no information regarding the value of the home, thus preclud-
ing an adequate comparison of the value of the property to the gravity of
the underlying offense.69
III. GOD BLESS SAVE THIS HOME: THE FACTS OF 1997 CHEVROLET
Come May 2017, the issue of excessive fines in the context of residen-
tial in rem forfeitures reached the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania again
in 1997 Chevrolet.70  Seventy-one-year-old homeowner Elizabeth Young had
resided in her West Philadelphia home since the 1970s.71  After being
placed on bed rest after a lengthy hospital stay in October 2009, Ms.
Young’s son, Donald Graham, and his two children moved in with her.72
The following month, the Philadelphia Police Department, which had sus-
pected Mr. Graham of selling drugs, set up controlled buys by using a
64. See id. at 337–40 (examining facts which pertain to gravity of underlying
offense).
65. 832 A.2d 396 (Pa. 2003).
66. See id. at 397–98 (explaining background information of case).
67. See id. at 397 (describing underlying offense and procedure of forfeiture).
68. See id. at 403 (“We hold today that Bajakajian’s gross disproportionality
test applies to all punitive forfeitures regardless of the form of the underlying pro-
ceedings.” (footnote omitted)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted.”).
69. See id. at 402–03 (noting that the commonwealth court paid “lip service”
to Bajakajian but actually used framework found in Bajakajian dissent, rather than
majority opinion, by focusing on harm caused and ignoring value of property).
70. See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized from James
Young, 160 A.3d 153, 159 (Pa. 2017) (addressing Eighth Amendment challenge to
forfeiture of residential property).
71. See id.
72. See id. (describing Ms. Young’s medical condition, which included diagno-
sis of and treatment for two blood clots in lungs).
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confidential informant who would call Mr. Graham and meet him outside
of Ms. Young’s home while the officers observed.73
After each of these buys, the informant would return with a small
packet of marijuana.74  This prompted the police to search Ms. Young’s
residence on November 19, 2009 while she was present; the search yielded
six small packets of marijuana and other materials typically used to weigh
and package marijuana.75  Although the officers told Ms. Young that her
son had been dealing drugs and they were there to arrest him, Mr. Gra-
ham was, in fact, not arrested.76  Rather, the police decided to conduct an
investigation into the home itself.77  As such, they set up four more con-
trolled buys, the last of which resulted in Mr. Graham’s arrest on the steps
of Ms. Young’s home.78 Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to possession of
marijuana with intent to deliver and was sentenced to eleven-to-twenty-
three months of house arrest.79
One month after sentencing Mr. Graham to house arrest, the Com-
monwealth filed a petition for forfeiture of the home.80  Represented by
pro bono attorneys, Ms. Young was able to navigate the procedural chan-
nels necessary to receive a hearing and to produce evidence.81  Attempt-
73. See id. (providing succinct timeline of controlled buys); see also Common-
wealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d 836, 841–42 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (providing
more detailed overview of drug investigation and use of confidential informant).
The first three controlled buys were substantially similar in that each time the in-
formant met Mr. Graham on the corner of 62nd and Pine streets, handed him
twenty to forty dollars in prerecorded cash, and brought the police back a small
plastic packet of marijuana. See 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at 841.
74. See id. (describing second controlled buy, conducted on November 14,
2009).
75. See id. at 842 (explaining that police obtained and executed search war-
rant).  Neither the legitimacy of the search warrant nor the presence of probable
cause is at dispute in this case. See id.
76. See id. at 842 (noting that according to an officer, Ms. Young “was in disbe-
lief when police informed her that [Mr. Graham] was selling drugs”).
77. See id. (“Instead, they decided to do an investigation into the property
situated on 416 S. 62nd St.” (internal quotation omitted)).
78. See id. at 843 (describing events leading up to and following Mr. Graham’s
arrest).  After the police arrested Mr. Graham, they searched his person as well as
Ms. Young’s home and vehicle. See id.  In the living room, they found 1.3 grams of
unpackaged marijuana, which “had a street value of $20 to $25.” See id.
79. See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized from James
Young, 160 A.3d 153, 160 (Pa. 2017) (noting that trial court did not impose fine
on Mr. Graham).
80. See id. (“While the Commonwealth never charged Appellee with any
crime, on October 20, 2010, the Commonwealth filed a petition for the forfeiture
of Appellee’s house and her vehicle under the Controlled Substances Forfeiture
Act . . . .” (citation omitted)).
81. See 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at 841–47 (describing forfeiture proceeding in
further detail, including evidence presented by Commonwealth and Ms. Young);
see also Chris Mondics, Law Review: Loss of Assets Shines Light on Civil Forfeiture, PHILA.
INQUIRER (June 30, 2014, 01:07 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/columnists/
chris-mondics/20140630_Law_Review__Loss_of_assets_shines_light_on_civil_for
feiture.html [https://perma.cc/G9NE-R5YY] (telling story behind 1997 Chevrolet
13
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ing to raise the innocent owner defense, Ms. Young averred that she was
unaware her son was dealing drugs.82
Despite the evidence Ms. Young produced, the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas rejected her contention that she was unaware of
the drug transactions and ordered the forfeiture of her home.83  This de-
cision was grounded in the theory that she facilitated the drug sales by
allowing her son to store drug paraphernalia on her property and partici-
pate in drug transactions in and around the house.84  From the court’s
perspective, Ms. Young was not entitled to the innocent homeowner de-
fense because she was present in the home when the police conducted the
search and did not take any affirmative steps to remove her son from the
home or otherwise inhibit his illegal conduct.85
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed the
trial court’s grant of forfeiture and remanded for further proceedings be-
cause the record did not include any evidence of any actual harm caused
by the offense.86  Furthermore, the commonwealth court explained that
the lower court erred in rejecting Ms. Young’s innocent owner defense
because it failed to consider all of the circumstances surrounding the illicit
use of the property; it was simply not enough that the police told Ms.
Young her son had been dealing drugs, as she was not required to believe
and remarking that Ms. Young had pro bono representation from lawyers at prom-
inent firm); Ballard Spahr Wins Landmark Civil Forfeiture Case: PA Supreme Court Deci-
sion Strengthens Eighth Amendment Protections, BALLARD SPAHR (May 25, 2017), http:/
/www.ballardspahr.com/eventsnews/pressreleases/2017-05-25-ballard-spahr-wins-
landmark-civil-forfeiture-case.aspx [https://perma.cc/T662-P5QN] (reporting
that Ballard Spahr attorneys Jessica Anthony, Jason Leckerman, and Joanna Hess
Kunz represented Ms. Young throughout the case).
82. See 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at 844 (explaining that Ms. Young testified
that she never saw her son use or keep drugs in her home and never allowed him
to use her minivan to transport or sell drugs).  Ms. Young also presented the testi-
mony of her neighbor, who had never noticed any behavior suggesting illicit use of
the property. See id. at 845–46.
83. See id. at 846 (explaining that the trial court ordered forfeiture after find-
ing a sufficient nexus “between the seized property” and Mr. Graham’s possession
of marijuana).
84. See id. (“[T]he trial court based its findings of fact on the credited testi-
mony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses that a confidential informant or infor-
mants had purchased drugs ‘inside or around the property’ and the vehicle; that
police recovered paraphernalia from inside the house; that Graham retrieved
drugs from the vehicle; and that there was marijuana on Graham’s person when he
was arrested.”).
85. See id. (noting trial court’s determination that Ms. Young, at best, “turned
a blind eye to son’s illegal conduct on the property, which constituted consent”
(internal quotations omitted)).
86. See id. at 854–55 (finding that it was not appropriate for trial court to
merely compare the $80,000 maximum monetary penalty to the collective mone-
tary value of home and vehicle because there was no evidence of Mr. Graham’s
actual penalty or actual harm caused by criminal activity).
14
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their allegations.87  The Commonwealth appealed the decision to the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania, which granted appeal to decide whether the
commonwealth court contravened United States and Pennsylvania su-
preme court precedent.88
IV. VICES AND VIRTUES: THE COURT’S ATTEMPT TO STRIKE A BALANCE
In 1997 Chevrolet, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania set out to deter-
mine the circumstances under which a forfeiture constitutes an excessive
fine under the Eighth Amendment.89  For the first time since 2003, the
court conducted an Eighth Amendment analysis on a civil forfeiture, and
broke new ground by highlighting specific factors to be considered when
making such a determination.90
The 1997 Chevrolet court began its analysis by acknowledging both the
significance of property rights in the abstract and the practical necessity
that homes and vehicles have become to “one’s life and livelihood.”91 The
court even went as far as quoting from a Prohibition-era forfeiture case,
boldly stating that “forfeitures are not favored”92  In the same breath, how-
ever, the 1997 Chevrolet court conceded the utility of civil forfeiture.93  Rec-
ognizing this tension, the court developed a two-prong test with
87. See id. at 870 (citing Commonwealth v. $2,523.48 U.S. Currency, 649 A.2d
658, 660 (Pa. 1994) (“We also reject the Commonwealth’s argument that Young
had to invite the police to her house to prove lack of consent.”).
88. See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized from James
Young, 120 A.3d 993 (Pa. 2015) (per curium) (granting Commonwealth’s petition
for allowance of appeal).
89. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 159 (“[W]e attempt to reconcile the uncer-
tain constitutional jurisprudence underlying civil in rem forfeiture and provide clar-
ity and uniformity regarding the appropriate constitutional standard to be applied
to excessive fines challenges to civil in rem forfeitures in our Commonwealth.”).
90. See Commonwealth v. 5444 Spruce St., 832 A.2d 396, 434–35 (Pa. 2003)
(reversing and remanding grant of forfeiture where sparse trial record inhibited
proportionality analysis); see also 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 191–92 (summarizing
holding and re-stating factors to be considered in Eighth Amendment proportion-
ality analyses).  Also noteworthy is that the court ruled unanimously on the issue.
See id. at 157 (indicating that all justices joined in majority opinion).
91. See id. at 177 (“Indeed, in our society, a home and a vehicle are often
essential to one’s life and livelihood.”).
92. See id. at 177–78 (quoting United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 De
Luxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226 (1939)).  In One 1936 Model Ford, the claimant had
purchased a vehicle previously used to illegally transport liquor for which the fed-
eral taxes had not been paid. See One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. at 222–23.  On
appeal, the Supreme Court found that he complied with the requirements of the
Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act by purchasing the vehicle in good faith.
See id. at 224.  Accordingly, the forfeiture claim was dismissed. See id.
93. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 178 (remarking that forfeiture “serves laud-
able goals”).  Among the legal doctrine’s virtues are that it removes illegal items
from the community, strips criminals and criminal enterprises of resources, “en-
courages property owners to prevent their property from being used for criminal”
purposes, and funds law enforcement. See id.
15
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delineated factors to provide courts undertaking this important issue with
“clarity and uniformity.”94
A. The Instrumentality Prong
Turning to the historical practice of civil in rem forfeiture, the court
then addressed the first requirement of a valid civil forfeiture: that the
property must be an instrumentality of the crime—conceptually based on
property “guilty of” or directly responsible for causing an offense.95  In
addition to the longstanding concept of “guilty property,” the court found
late-Justice Antonin Scalia’s concurrence in Austin persuasive as to the im-
portance of the relationship between the property and the underlying
crime.96  Therefore, the Eighth Amendment necessitates a threshold find-
ing that the property to be seized is an instrumentality of the offense.97
The 1997 Chevrolet court explained that the instrumentality question
turns on whether the property was “‘significantly used in the commission
of the offense.’”98  Specifically, the court delineated six factors to be con-
sidered when making a determination as to this relationship.99  These fac-
tors are whether: (1) “the property was uniquely important to the success
of the illegal activity”; (2) “the use of the property was deliberate and
planned”; (3) the illegal use of the property was isolated or repeated; (4)
94. See id. (noting significant degree of uncertainty in excessive fine
jurisprudence).
95. See id. at 178–79 (providing distinction between in rem and in personam
forfeitures).  In personam forfeitures proceed directly against a property-owner
who has been accused of a crime. See id.  In rem forfeitures, on the other hand,
are civil proceedings against a piece of property itself, which does not need to be
connected to a criminal conviction. See id.
96. See id. at 181 (“While, in Austin, Justice Scalia’s strict focus on the relation-
ship of the property to the crime did not carry the day as discussed above, it cer-
tainly informs our analysis of the instrumentality question.”).  Because civil
forfeiture is in rem as opposed to in personam, Justice Scalia posited that it is not
the culpability, or guilt, of the owner, but the relationship between the property
and the crime that determines whether a forfeiture is excessive under the Eighth
Amendment. See id. (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 625–26 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
97. See id. at 185 (“Therefore, we hold that an instrumentality analysis, which
considers the relationship between the property to be forfeited and the underlying
criminal activity, must be a threshold inquiry in addressing an excessiveness chal-
lenge to a civil in rem forfeiture.”).
98. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 183 (quoting In re King Props., 635 A.2d
128, 133 (Pa. 1993)).  In King Properties, the court affirmed the forfeiture of a crimi-
nal defendant’s home where clear and convincing evidence showed that the owner
used the property to further his ongoing drug trade.  635 A.2d at 133.  Large
amounts of cash, drugs, and drug paraphernalia found in the home were sufficient
to establish a “significant relationship between” the criminal conduct and the
property forfeited. See id. (discussing Austin, 509 U.S. at 625–26 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
99. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 191 (cautioning that prescribed “factors are
not meant to be exhaustive, and that additional factors, when relevant, may be
considered by a court, depending upon the particular circumstances at issue”).
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“the purpose of acquiring, maintaining, or using the property was to carry
out the offense”; (5) the illegal use of the property was extensive spatially,
temporally, or both and (6) “the property is divisible with respect to the
subject of forfeiture.”100
B. The Proportionality Prong
Next, the 1997 Chevrolet court relied on Bajakajian in adopting a pro-
portionality prong to the Eighth Amendment excessive fine analysis.101
The court agreed with the majority’s conclusion in Bajakajian that a pro-
portionality review is an indispensable element of an excessive fine in-
quiry.102  That is, a forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine under the
Eighth Amendment where the amount of the forfeiture is grossly dispro-
portional to the gravity of the underlying offense.103
1. Amount of Forfeiture: Hybrid Value of Property
Because the amount of the currency seized in Bajakajian was self-evi-
dent, the 1997 Chevrolet court did not have any precedent to draw upon in
determining the amount of a forfeiture of a residential property.104  Ulti-
mately, the court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that Bajakajian
requires only a consideration of the property’s monetary value and instead
opted to consider not only the fair market value of the property, but also
its subjective value.105  Assessing the subjective value of a piece of property
involves taking into account whether the property is a family residence,
100. See id. (summarizing factors to be considered in instrumentality determi-
nation, but noting that list is not exhaustive).  Because the Commonwealth in 1997
Chevrolet argued that no such instrumentality requirement existed, the Penn-
sylvania supreme court did not apply these factors to the facts at hand but instead
remanded to the commonwealth court for reconsideration in light of this new
standard. See id. at 192.
101. See id. at 186 (emphasizing that proportionality is “the touchstone of the
constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause” (emphasis omitted)
(quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998))).
102. See id. at 166 (explaining that Bajakajian stands for principle that puni-
tive forfeitures require proportionality determination as part of excessiveness anal-
ysis (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 333–34)).
103. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 186 (“Broadly speaking . . . [i]f the amount
of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense, it is uncon-
stitutional.” (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336–37)).  The Bajakajian Court, how-
ever, did not mandate that any particular factors be considered when performing
such a proportionality analysis. See id.; supra note 64 and accompanying text for
analysis that the Bajakajian Court refrained from defining categorical approach to
proportionality.  Because the forfeiture in Bajakajian dealt with currency, the
Court gave no indication of how to value different types of property that are not as
objectively quantifiable. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 187–88.
104. See id. at 187 (noting that Supreme Court in Bajakajian used term
“amount” referring to property because it was currency, while in 5444 Spruce Street,
the Pennsylvania supreme court referred to “value” of property because it was real
property).
105. See id. at 188 (explaining that certain pieces of property, such as resi-
dences and vehicles, carry additional value aside from monetary worth and might
17
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the harm forfeiture would bring to the owner or innocent third parties,
and whether the forfeiture would deprive the property owner’s
livelihood.106
2. Gravity of the Offense
To assess the gravity of the underlying offense at issue, the 1997 Chev-
rolet court applied the Bajakajian factors as delineated in 5444 Spruce
Street.107  Gravity is measured by considering (1) the nature of the crime;
(2) the relation of the violation to any other illegal activity; (3) the maxi-
mum sentence that could have been imposed; (4) the actual harm caused;
(5) regularity of the conduct; (6) and the culpability of the property
owner.108  Importantly, the court emphasized that the government must
articulate the specific harm caused, beyond a generalized harm to soci-
ety.109  As a result, the 1997 Chevrolet court rejected the Commonwealth’s
require subjective evaluation, but qualifying that in some circumstances, simple
market value may be appropriate).
106. See id. (“certain property—such as a residence, a vehicle, or other similar
necessities in our daily life—carry additional value to the owner and possibly
others”); see also United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2016).  In
Viloski, a real estate broker was ordered to forfeit $1,273,285.50, which he had ac-
quired through kickbacks and then laundered. See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 107.  In
determining whether the forfeiture constituted an excessive fine, the Second Cir-
cuit placed an emphasis on considering whether the forfeiture would deprive him
of his livelihood, which the court defined as his future ability to earn a living. See
id. at 111.  The legal basis for such a consideration derives from the Magna Carta,
which required that payments to the Crown “not be so large as to deprive an of-
fender of his or livelihood.” See id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 269 (1989)).  Ultimately, the court found that
the forfeiture at issue would not have deprived the claimant of his ability to earn a
living upon his release from prison. See id. at 114.
107. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 189 (noting that both Bajakajian and 5444
Spruce Street focused on culpability-based factors).  The court then concluded:
[I]n our view, in analyzing the gravity of the offense, a court must con-
sider these Bajakajian factors. In doing so, a court must consider the es-
sence of the crime—that is, the nature of the underlying offense.  Related
thereto, the relation of the offense to any other illegal activity and
whether the offender fit into the class of persons for whom the offense
was designed should be considered.  Further, the court should take into
account the maximum penalty as compared to the penalty imposed upon
the criminal offender.  In making this assessment, the actual penalty im-
posed (sentence, fine) upon the offender giving rise to the forfeiture is
compared to the maximum authorized sentence for the underlying of-
fenses for which the offender was convicted.  Moreover, the regularity of
the criminal conduct must be considered, including whether the illegal
acts were isolated or frequent, constituting a pattern of misbehavior.  Fi-
nally, a court must take into account the harm resulting from the crime
charged.
Id. at 189–90.
108. See id. (listing factors taken from Bajakajian and 5444 Spruce Street).
109. See id. at 190 (affirming commonwealth court’s rejection of Common-
wealth’s claim that crime committed was harmful to society, on grounds that “all
crimes have a negative impact in some general way to society”).
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bare assertion that harm can be inferred in cases of drug trafficking within
residential neighborhoods.110
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: LACK OF A CATEGORICAL RULE LEAVES
HOMEOWNERS WITHOUT SANCTUARY
At first blush, the Pennsylvania supreme court’s two-step instrumen-
tality and proportionality test with specific factors seems to offer greater
constitutional protection to homeowners facing forfeiture.111 1997 Chev-
rolet, however, is not cause for definitive celebration.112  Even in light of
the decision’s nuanced interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohi-
bition against excessive fines, the gross disproportionality standard falls
short of a categorical protection necessary to a society experiencing bur-
geoning rates of homelessness and housing instability.113  Rather than es-
tablishing a clear rule that removing a family from its home as punishment
for a drug-related offense is per se excessive under the Constitution, 1997
Chevrolet invites courts to consider not only the factors it prescribes, but
also any other factor the trial court deems relevant to the overall resolu-
tion of the excessive fine challenge.114  Although providing courts with
the opportunity to consider all relevant factors may work to the favor of
homeowners in some cases, allowing such discretion can just as easily re-
sult in affirmative forfeiture rulings.115
By failing to promulgate a presumption of excessiveness in cases of
residential forfeiture, 1997 Chevrolet does not give ample weight to the
sanctity of homeownership, which has long been recognized by the
110. See id. at 175, 190 (stating Commonwealth’s argument and delineating
the factors to be considered in excessive fine analysis).
111. See, e.g., BALLARD SPAHR, supra note 81 (reporting that 1997 Chevrolet pro-
vides Pennsylvania residents facing forfeiture with the “most robust constitutional
protections in the country”).
112. See Cassella & Smith, supra note 11, at 68 (arguing that right to counsel is
essential to civil forfeiture reform); see also Rachel L. Stuteville, Comment, Reverse
Robinhood: The Tale of How Texas Law Enforcement Has Used Civil Asset Forfeiture to
Take from Property Owners and Pad the Pockets of Local Government—the Righteous Hunt
for Reform Is On, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1169, 1192–97 (2014) (providing overview
of most progressive civil forfeiture reform throughout country, including increas-
ing public accountability, disallowing proceeds from being distributed to law en-
forcement agencies, requiring criminal conviction, and requiring state to prove
property subject to forfeiture beyond reasonable doubt).
113. See, e.g., State Data and Contacts Map, supra note 13.  For a more detailed
analysis of the proportionality test, see supra notes 101–10 and accompanying text
for explanation that subjective value of property—such as the value of having a
roof over one’s head—should be taken into account.
114. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 191 (“[A]dditional factors, when relevant,
may be considered by a court, depending upon the particular circumstances at
issue.”).
115. See, e.g., von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 188 (2d Cir. 2007)
(finding that forfeiture of husband’s interest in family home was not grossly dispro-
portionate to offense of cultivating marijuana, in part because “his own actions
eviscerated any sanctity he might claim in his home”).
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courts.116  Although courts are now obligated to consider the subjective
value of a home subject to forfeiture, the 1997 Chevrolet court did not ex-
cise the objective market value consideration from the excessive fine analy-
sis, thus leaving low-income homeowners—who are already at a
significantly higher risk of homelessness than their more affluent counter-
parts—more vulnerable to forfeiture.117  A presumption that civil forfei-
ture of a primary residence violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment would adequately protect low-income homeowners
and uphold the sanctity of homeownership, without abridging the objec-
tives of forfeiture.118
116. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (recognizing
“the sanctity of a man’s home”); see also Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848
(2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (denying certiorari).  Although Justice Thomas
ultimately joined in the Court’s denial of certiorari in Leonard, his concurring
opinion suggested that the current implementation of civil forfeiture swallows the
doctrine’s original purpose of allowing the government to seize property that
would otherwise be out of the government’s reach due to an out-of-jurisdiction
owner. See id. at 849.
117. See, e.g., United States v. 25445 Via Dona Christa, No. 95-56352, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 36917, at *14 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 1998) (finding that “continuous drug-
related activity at the property outweighed any intangible value it had as a family
home”); Sheriff’s Sale WebAPP, PHILA. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, https://www.officeofphila
delphiasheriff.com/en/real-estate/sheriffs-sale-webapp [https://perma.cc/4PKU-
X4E2] (last visited Sept. 16, 2017) (listing 474 properties up for sheriff’s sale due
to mortgage foreclosure and 313 properties up for sale due to real estate tax delin-
quency in September 2017).
118. Although law enforcement has a legitimate objective in keeping illicit
drug enterprises out of residential areas, civil forfeiture has proven ineffective in
ridding communities of drug trade and has instead been selectively applied to
poor, African-American homeowners. See Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 848 (recounting
the “egregious and well-chronicled” abuses of civil forfeiture and lamenting that
modern civil forfeiture operations target low-income individuals, who are most
burdened by such forfeitures); see also Louis S. Rulli, Seizing Family Homes from the
Innocent: Can the Eighth Amendment Protect Minorities and the Poor from Excessive Pun-
ishment in Civil Forfeiture?, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1111, 1143–46 (2017) (contrasting
the average assessed value of forfeited properties in Philadelphia ($23,174.34) with
that of un-seized property involved in extensive drug activity belonging to affluent,
white families); Yan Slavinsky, Protecting the Family Home by Reunderstanding United
States v. Bajakajian, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1619, 1647 (2014) (“A stronger emphasis
by courts to carefully value family homes would not harm [civil forfeiture] strategy
and would help focus prosecutors on identifying forfeitures that can make a dent
in criminal enterprise and take the profits out of crime.”).  Furthermore, the pre-
sumption advocated in this Note would only apply to properties used as primary
residences rather than those colloquially referred to as “trap houses,” which are
not suitable for inhabitation and are solely used for drug manufacture and sale.
See, e.g., Gabriel v. State, 842 S.W.2d 328, 329–33 (Tex. 1992) (describing a “crack”
or “trap” house as “a facility used exclusively for the sale of drugs” that is “usually
barren of furniture”).  Therefore, this presumption would not unreasonably con-
travene the policing objective of keeping residential areas used for residential
rather than illicit purposes.  For a further discussion of the legitimate objectives of
civil forfeiture, see infra notes 155–67 and accompanying text.
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A. Presumption of Excessiveness: The Savior We Need
To safeguard homeownership interests, 1997 Chevrolet instructs courts
to consider a variety of factors underlying a forfeiture action, some of
which weigh in favor of homeowners, while others strongly disfavor homes
involved in drug-related activity.119  However, under the 1997 Chevrolet
test, the sanctity of homeownership is obscured in that a court is free to
assign relative weight to theoretically unlimited factors.120  Rather than
merely considering the subjective value of a home as one of many factors
involved in a forfeiture, courts should recognize a presumption of exces-
siveness where a primary residence is subject to forfeiture.121
1. More Than a Mere Instrumentality of Crime
In 1997 Chevrolet, the court decided that the instrumentality prong
turned on whether the property was “‘significantly utilized in the commis-
sion’ of the offense.”122  To flesh out the meaning of such a standard, the
court listed six factors to be considered when making an instrumentality
determination.123  However, applying these factors in the context of typi-
cal cases of drug-related forfeitures such as 1997 Chevrolet will likely pro-
duce varying results, thus providing little security to low-income
homeowners.124
119. For a more detailed analysis of the factors laid out in 1997 Chevrolet, see
supra notes 95–110 and accompanying text.
120. See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized from James
Young, 160 A.3d 153, 191 (Pa. 2017) (allowing for consideration of additional fac-
tors depending on circumstances of forfeiture).  In 1997 Chevrolet, the court pre-
scribed fifteen factors to be considered when conducting an excessive fine analysis,
only three of which contemplate the importance of the home. See id. at 192 (find-
ing that subjective value of the property, harm forfeiture would cause to owner or
third parties, and whether forfeiture would deprive owner of his or her livelihood
must be considered by courts conducting proportionality analyses).
121. See van den Berg, supra note 31 at 902 (noting that lower courts tend to
selectively apply multi-factor proportionality test).
122. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 185 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wingait
Farms, 690 A.2d 222, 227 (Pa. 1997)).
123. See id. at 185.  The court stated:
Considerations regarding this “significant utilization” assessment include:
whether the property was integral to the commission of the offense—i.e.,
uniquely important to the success of the illegal activity; whether the use
of the property was deliberate and planned or was merely incidental and
fortuitous to the illegal enterprise; whether the illegal use of the property
was an isolated event, or repeated; whether the purpose of acquiring,
maintaining or using the property was to carry out the offense; and
whether the illegal use of the property was extensive spatially and/or
temporally.
Id. (citing United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.2d 841, 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1995)).
124. The fact pattern of 1997 Chevrolet is not unusual among cases of drug-
related forfeitures. See, e.g., United States v. Collado, 348 F.3d 323, 325 (2d Cir.
2003) (per curium) (granting forfeiture of building containing residential apart-
ments where owner’s son had been selling and buying drugs in its vicinity); United
States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 742 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that
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First, the question of whether the home was uniquely important to
the success of the drug-related offense is a malleable factor; one can argue
that the home is merely a location of the drug activity, and thus not essen-
tial to the crime because drug deals can occur in a variety of environ-
ments.125  Nevertheless, data showing that drug sales increasingly occur
inside homes as open-air markets become less prevalent undermines this
argument.126  Likewise, in cases where the home functions as a site for
drug manufacture, the argument that a home is not integral to drug-re-
lated offenses loses legitimacy.127
Next, considering whether the use of the home was deliberately
planned or fortuitous is likely to favor forfeiture, as individuals tend to
store things in and arrange meetings at their homes out of convenience
rather than happenstance.128  The following factor, whether the illegal
use of the property was an isolated or repeated event, is also largely useless
to homeowners, given that law enforcement agencies often do not end
their investigations upon the first observation of drug-related criminal
forfeiture of father’s home due to his son’s drug-related offense would violate Ex-
cessive Fines Clause); Commonwealth v. 12534 Chilton Rd., No. 1254 C.D. 2014,
2015 WL 6755111, at *3–4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (ruling whether wife and home-
owner’s interest in property was properly subjected to forfeiture based on hus-
band’s possession with intent to deliver offense), vacated in light of 1997 Chevrolet,
169 A.3d 579 (Pa. 2017) (table); Commonwealth v. 5444 Spruce St., 787 A.2d 1117,
1123 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (affirming forfeiture of Philadelphia woman’s long-
time home after she pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to de-
liver), rev’d, 832 A.2d 396 (Pa. 2003).
125. See, e.g., 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. at 737–38 (finding that home
was not integral to its occupant’s drug possession or transactions because property
was “nothing more than a place at which drugs were sold,” and there was no addi-
tional link between commission of crime and home).  The 6625 Zumirez Drive court
also reasoned that the forfeiture at hand was unlike forfeitures of property integral
to an offense because the seizure of the home “[did] not rid society of the instru-
mentality of the crime or eliminate the resources of any criminal enterprise.” See
id. at 738.  Rather, it only functioned to evict a father and son from their home. See
id.
126. See, e.g., Graham C. Ousey & Matthew R. Lee, Homicide Trends and Illicit
Drug Markets: Exploring Differences Across Time, 24 JUST. Q. 48, 55 (2007) (“[D]rug
dealing operations increasingly have moved indoors to private, protected, residen-
tial settings rather than the vulnerable settings of crack houses or open-air street
markets that were commonplace in the 1980s.”).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 366 (4th Cir. 1994) (not-
ing that property subject to forfeiture aided drug-related activity by providing a
“secluded location”).
128. See, e.g., United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate, 903 F.2d 490, 494
(7th Cir. 1990) (finding that use of property was not fortuitous where owner had
instructed potential buyer, who happened to be undercover investigator, to call
owner’s home phone number and had two conversations with investigator on
home telephone while arranging drug transaction). But see von Hofe v. United
States, 492 F.3d 175, 188 (2d Cir. 2007) (contemplating that in context of excessive
fine analysis, “[t]he location of a drug sale, for instance, may be more a function of
happenstance than reason,” as opposed to homeowner’s cultivation of marijuana
in basement, which was a “conscious and deliberate decision”).
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conduct.129  Even where a forfeiture does occur after one isolated drug
offense, it is common that a search of the home will reveal some type of
drug paraphernalia or the Commonwealth will introduce testimonial evi-
dence to establish a pattern of drug-related activity.130
In contrast, the consideration of whether the property was purchased,
acquired, or maintained for the purpose of carrying out the underlying
offense will likely disfavor forfeiture in cases like 1997 Chevrolet and 5444
Spruce Street.131  That is, the very fact that the property provides shelter to
an individual or family belies the notion that it was acquired for the sole
purpose of furthering a criminal enterprise.132  However, courts have
nonetheless found forfeiture appropriate in cases where the property used
to facilitate drug-related crimes also served other legitimate, even residen-
tial, purposes.133
Like the previous two factors, considering whether the illicit use of
the property was extensive spatially or temporally may favor elderly or
long-term homeowners such as Ms. Young, as the sheer time period of
homeownership places a heavy burden on the government to prove that
the home facilitated the drug-related activity since its purchase.134  The
spatial consideration also has the potential of protecting homes of which
129. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized from James
Young, 160 A.3d 153, 159–60 (Pa. 2017) (explaining that Philadelphia Police De-
partment conducted two controlled buys, executed search warrant, and then con-
ducted three additional controlled buys before arresting Ms. Young’s son and
filing petition to forfeit her home); Commonwealth v. 605 Univ. Drive, 104 A.3d
411, 413 (Pa. 2014) (explaining that owner of property was arrested after “a joint
investigation by Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General and Centre County Drug
Task Force” and pleaded guilty to multiple sales of cocaine).
130. See Commonwealth v. 5444 Spruce St., 787 A.2d 1117, 1119 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2001) (citing testimony of juvenile who claimed to have purchased drugs from
homeowner as evidence of pattern of criminal use of property), rev’d, 832 A.2d 396
(Pa. 2003).
131. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 159 (noting that Ms. Young had resided in
her home for four decades prior to forfeiture); see also 5444 Spruce St., 787 A.2d at
1121 n.7 (stating that homeowner Elizabeth Lewis had been living in her home
since 1962, thirty-four years before forfeiture at issue).
132. Cf. United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841 842–43, 848 (2d Cir. 1995)
(upholding civil forfeiture of eighty-five-acre wooded piece of land used to culti-
vate marijuana and noting that home on the property was not claimant’s primary
residence).
133. See, e.g., United States v. 11869 Westshore Drive, 70 F.3d 923, 930 (6th
Cir. 1995) (affirming civil forfeiture of family’s residence where home operated as
“sales office” in which marijuana transactions were arranged, along with barn that
was used as warehouse for marijuana storage); United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d
358, 366 (4th Cir. 1994) (“While it would appear that the farm had substantial
purposes other than serving as an instrument of drug activity, the property never-
theless was an important, if not necessary, instrument for the drug activity, in pro-
viding a secluded location.”).
134. But see von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 188 (2d Cir. 2007) (find-
ing that the temporal and spatial extent of the criminal activity favored forfeiture
of interest in property where homeowner grew marijuana in basement for one
year, even though he and his wife had lived in property for over twenty years).
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only portions are involved in drug crimes, such as the curtilage or a partic-
ular room.135  However, homes that are relatively new or used more exten-
sively for drug transactions—but nonetheless provide shelter to individuals
and families—are left more vulnerable under this factor.136
The final consideration under the instrumentality prong, whether the
property is divisible with respect to the subject of the forfeiture, purport-
edly serves the function of allowing forfeiture of only the discrete property
that is integral to the underlying offense.137  In the context of drug-related
forfeitures of primary residences, however, this consideration is not appli-
cable, as dwellings are typically indivisible structures.138  Therefore, the
foregoing factors, considered together, favor a finding that the home of
an owner or occupant involved in drug-related activity is an instrumental-
ity of the offense.139
2. Value of the Home
Despite recognizing the universal sanctity and necessity of homeown-
ership, the 1997 Chevrolet court did not do away with the objective, fair-
market-value consideration.140  While it may seem logical to account for
the monetary value of property when comparing it to the maximum fine
imposed, this consideration is inappropriate because it disfavors low-in-
come property owners whose modest homes represent a significant por-
135. See, e.g., 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 160–62 (explaining that search of Ms.
Young’s home only yielded a scale, plastic packets, “and six baggies of marijuana,”
and transactions occurred around rather than inside of home).  For a detailed
explanation of the meaning of the term “curtilage,” see Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 171 (1984) (describing curtilage as “the land immediately surrounding
and associated with the home”).
136. See 11869 Westshore Drive, 70 F.3d at 930 (noting that district court con-
cluded “the house was used as a ‘sales office’ in which sales of marijuana were
arranged”); see also Commonwealth v. 5043 Anderson Rd., 728 A.2d 907, 907–09
(Pa. 1999) (affirming forfeiture of residence which housed property owner, his
wife, and two-month-old child on the basis that owner had been operating lucra-
tive business selling marijuana from home for several years).
137. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 191 (summarizing six factors to be consid-
ered when conducting excessive fine analysis under Eighth Amendment); supra
note 100 and accompanying text for list of factors.
138. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 185 (“[I]f the property is not divisible, the
entire property is forfeited.” (citing 5043 Anderson Rd., 728 A.2d at 909)).  In 5043
Anderson Rd., the Pennsylvania supreme court held that because only the property
owner’s home and adjoining land had been used in his marijuana sales, the Com-
monwealth was not permitted to seize his remaining real property.  728 A.2d at
909; cf. Idaho Dep’t of Law Enf’t v. Real Prop. Located in Minidoka Cty., 885 P.2d
381, 383 (Idaho 1994) (conceding that house itself is not divisible property).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 1452, 1462 (7th Cir. 1995) (find-
ing a close relationship between drug ring participant’s home and drug distribu-
tion where the owner made single phone call furthering conspiracy from
residence).
140. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 188 (“[I]n the realm of civil in rem forfei-
ture, both an objective pecuniary and subjective non-pecuniary valuation of the
property is necessary.”).
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tion of their assets.141  When a low-income family loses its place of shelter,
in addition to its main source of equity, that family is inevitably at greater
risk of homelessness than a family with greater financial security.142
On the other hand, the remaining factors to be considered when de-
termining the value of a home—the harm forfeiture would bring to the
owner or third parties and whether forfeiture would deprive the owner of
his or her livelihood—decidedly favor low-income homeowners.143  It is
beyond dispute that subjecting individuals or families to homelessness or
otherwise unstable housing causes emotional and physical trauma.144  Fur-
thermore, shelter is among the most basic needs on which the ability to
141. See, e.g., THOMAS P. BOEHM & ALAN SCHLOTTMANN, OFFICE OF POL’Y DEV.
& RES., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., WEALTH ACCUMULATION AND HOME-
OWNERSHIP: EVIDENCE FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 33 (2004), https://
www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/wealthaccumulationandhomeownership.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N295-RFJL] (reporting benefits of homeownership among
lower class families).  This report finds that:
In terms of lower income households, non-housing wealth accumulation
is at best minor and, for minority families, often negative.  Thus, over the
nine year period of [the] study, owned housing is an important means of
wealth accumulation.  Indeed, [the] results may be broadly interpreted
for lower income households as implying that housing wealth is total
wealth.
Id.; cf. MICHAL GRINSTEIN-WEISS ET AL., HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE, HOMEOWNERSHIP AND
WEALTH AMONG LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 3–4 (2013) (“Home
equity represents 60 percent of the total wealth among the American middle
class.” (citing EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF
WEALTH IN AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2002))).
142. See Barrett A. Lee et al., The New Homelessness Revisited, 36 ANN. REV. SOC.
501, 502 (2010) (contrasting individuals living in poverty from affluent individuals
in that latter group is able to avoid homelessness in event that its homes are unex-
pectedly lost).
143. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 188 (listing factors involved in making
non-pecuniary valuation of property); cf. United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175
F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999).  The court in 817 N.E. 29th Drive held:
whether a forfeiture is excessive is determined by comparing the amount
of the forfeiture to the gravity of the offense . . . and not by comparing
the amount of the forfeiture to the amount of the owner’s assets.  In
other words, excessiveness is determined in relation to the characteristics
of the offense, not in relation to the characteristics of the offender.
Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. See Lee et al., supra note 142, at 506 (noting that likelihood of becoming
victim to crime is increased for those experiencing long periods of homelessness,
which is evidenced by fact that over one half of homeless persons contacted during
study claimed to have been victimized); see also Colleen E. Wynn & Lauren Mc-
Clain, Not Quite out on the Streets: Housing Tenure Among Low-Income Urban Fathers 9
(Princeton, NJ: Ctr. for Res. on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. WP 13-17-FF,
2015), https://fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/sites/fragilefamilies/files/wp13-17-
ff.pdf [https://perma.cc/QSA7-4KUZ] (“It has also been demonstrated that doub-
ling up is negatively associated with mental health while homeownership is posi-
tively associated with mental health.” (citations omitted)).  “Doubling up” refers to
an unstable form of housing in which otherwise homeless individuals or families
live with other families and share the cost of rent. See id. at 3, 5; see also Steven R.
Paisner, Comment, Compassion, Politics, and the Problems Lying on Our Sidewalks: A
Legislative Approach for Cities to Address Homelessness, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1259, 1265–68
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make a living depends.145  Hence, the subjective value of a home is more
meaningful than its market value and should be given greater weight in an
excessive fine analysis.146
3. Gravity of the Offense
First, defining the gravity of an underlying offense in drug-related for-
feitures will involve considering the particular charge and whether that is a
variation of possession or a more serious charge such as distribution or
manufacture.147  Taking into account the nature of the specific drug-re-
lated offense will, theoretically, protect most homeowners facing forfeiture
in connection with lower-level offenses, while leaving vulnerable those
whose property is involved with manufacture or distribution of harsher
drugs.148  The next factor, whether the offender fits into the class of per-
(1994) (providing overview of health and welfare problems among homeless
population).
145. See Wynn & McClain, supra note 144, at 4 (“Housing security has been
cited as the single most important factor for obtaining access to employment and
social services because a valid address is often required” (citing Amanda Geller &
Allyson Walker, Partner Incarceration and Women’s Housing Insecurity (Princeton, NJ:
Ctr. for Res. on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. WP 12-02FF, 2012)).
146. See, e.g., Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A
Public Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 723–24 (2008) (noting that
“[i]ncreasing homeownership rates is fundamental objective of public policy at
every level of government”); see also D. Benjamin Barros, Home As a Legal Concept,
46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 265 n.38 (2006) (highlighting importance of home-
ownership by explaining homes’ historic legal protection compared to other prop-
erty such as ships and characterizing modern civil forfeiture practice as “an
unwarranted erosion of the protection given to homes”).
147. See, e.g., United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1309–10
(stating that courts must “[t]ranslat[e] the gravity of a crime into monetary terms”
by looking to “the maximum permissible fine for a given offense” and the sentenc-
ing guidelines).  Courts have been far less generous in cases where the property
has been involved in mass cultivation of controlled substance or has served as the
site of a consistent distribution chain or large-scale transaction. See, e.g., United
States v. 60795 Rimrock Canyon Rd., No. 07cv2322, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132737,
at *6 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2009) (upholding forfeiture where police found over 1,000
marijuana plants in home, along with packaging materials which suggested that
plants were intended for distribution rather than personal use); cf. United States v.
Shelly’s Riverside Heights Lot x, 851 F. Supp. 633, 634 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (“In the
instant case, there is no question that the offense was a serious one.  In the realm
of drug offenses, however, it was not a crime of tremendous gravity . . . .”).  The
specific drug-related activity in Shelly’s Riverside Heights Lot x involved the indoor
cultivation of approximately twenty marijuana plants, which resulted in charges of
manufacturing marijuana with the intent to distribute and with conspiracy thereof.
See id. at 634.  For a comprehensive listing of drug offenses in Pennsylvania, see
generally 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-113 (West 2018).
148. See, e.g., United States v. 24124 Lemay St., 857 F. Supp. 1373, 1382 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (finding that “the inherent gravity of [homeowner’s] . . . offenses” of
possession of cocaine for sale and cultivation of over 100 marijuana plants was
“severe”).  For a complete schedule of controlled substances in Pennsylvania, see
generally 35 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-104.
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sons for whom the offense was designed, will likely present the same
problem.149
The following gravity of the offense factor, the maximum authorized
penalty as compared to the actual penalty imposed, is a bit clumsier, as it is
not clear whether courts are to use an objective, subjective, or hybrid valu-
ation of the property forfeited in this comparison.150  If Pennsylvania
courts opt for the straight fair-market-value approach, as have other juris-
dictions, this will again breed inequality between communities of low-in-
come homeowners and wealthier communities.151  Importantly, the final
gravity factor, the specific harm resulting from the criminal offense, will
no longer allow courts to summarily state that drug-related crimes are in-
herently harmful to the community.152
149. See 60795 Rimrock Canyon Rd., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132737, at *6 (re-
marking that “a drug manufacturer clearly ‘fit[s] into the class of persons for
which the [civil forfeiture] statute was designed” (quoting United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 338 (1997))).  In Bajakajian, the Court noted that forfei-
ture in cases of failing to report currency when traveling outside of the country was
intended to punish “money launderers, drug traffickers, and tax evaders.” See
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 323.  While it was perhaps improper to merely quote
Bajakajian without examining the legislative intent of the specific provision of the
forfeiture statute relating to drug manufacture, a “drug manufacturer” cultivating
over a thousand marijuana plants likely does fit into the class of persons for which
the offense was designed. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (2012) (providing for the for-
feiture of “[a]ll real property . . . used, or intended to be used, in any manner or
part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this title punisha-
ble by more than one year’s imprisonment”).
150. See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized from James
Young, 160 A.3d 153, 190 (Pa. 2017) (including parenthetical indicating that pen-
alty imposed refers to “sentence [or] fine,” but neglecting to specify whether fine
is to be valued based on fair market value or subjective considerations).
151. See, e.g., 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d at 1309 (interpreting Bajakajian as
creating “strong presumption” of forfeiture where objective value of property for-
feited does not excess statutory maximum fine for offense); 60795 Rimrock Canyon
Rd., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132737, at *9 (comparing pecuniary value of home,
$300,000, to maximum statutory fine, $4,000,000); United States v. 6625 Zumirez
Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 737 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (declining to focus solely on maxi-
mum penalty compared to home’s fair market value, noting substantial monetary
interest in the property but also highlighting owner’s “ ‘right to maintain control
over his home, and to be free from governmental interference, is a private interest
of historic and continuing importance’” (quoting United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–54 (1993))).
152. See 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 170 (affirming commonwealth court’s re-
jection of Commonwealth’s generic claim that drug-related activity harmed society
at large, requiring instead evidence as to “the type and quantity of drugs sold, the
use of illegal drugs by purchasers, and the impact of the sales upon the neighbor-
hood, without reliance upon general or ‘self-evident’ harm”). But see Common-
wealth v. Pruitt, No. 1485 C.D. 2010, 2011 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 697, at *6
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011) (relying on claim that “it is essentially self-evident
that illegal narcotics sales harm the surrounding community” to show harm caused
by homeowner’s possession with intent charge (quoting Commonwealth v. 542 On-
tario St., Bethlehem, Pa., 989 A.2d 411, 419 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010))).  The court
in 542 Ontario St., although claiming that harm was self-evident in these offenses,
went on to support the claim with evidence from the record, citing the large strain
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B. Preserving the Sanctity of Homeownership Without Rendering Forfeiture a
Burnt Offering
By prescribing so many factors that could be interpreted either in
favor of or against forfeiture of residential properties for drug-related of-
fenses, the 1997 Chevrolet court leaves property rights for low-income
homeowners in peril.153  This remains the case even though the forfeiture
of a small family home does not coincide with the legislature’s original
intent of crippling large-scale drug organizations.154  In fact, in examining
the utility of forfeitures, it is apparent that the practice’s laudable objec-
tives are not met in cases such as 1997 Chevrolet.155
The first commonly cited goal of forfeiture is to punish the wrong-
doer.156  While it is certainly punishment to be evicted from one’s home
and stripped of a significant financial asset, in many cases of residential
the “countermeasures” taken by the police department placed on government re-
sources and the heightened danger of criminal conspiracies. See 542 Ontario St.,
989 A.2d at 419.  While it is questionable whether this purported harm would
stand up to constitutional muster given the generic nature of the conspiracy expla-
nation and the Supreme Court’s hesitancy to credit solely governmental harm in
Bajakajian, the court did attempt to make a specific showing of harm. See id.; see
also Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339 (“The harm that respondent caused was also mini-
mal.  The failure to report affected only one party, the Government, and in a rela-
tively minor way.”).
153. For a critical analysis of the 1997 Chevrolet court’s holding and its implica-
tions, see supra notes 111–52 and accompanying text.
154. See Klein, supra note 15, at 208 (“Clearly, if law enforcement efforts to
combat racketeering and drug trafficking are to be successful, they must include
an attack on the economic aspects of these crimes.” (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at
191 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374)); see also Sackett, supra note
38, at 502 (explaining that Congress amended the civil forfeiture provision of the
federal Drug Control Act for the purpose of deterring and punishing “the enor-
mously profitable trade in dangerous drugs”).
155. For a discussion of the objectives of forfeiture, see infra notes 156–66
and accompanying text.  Just as the sanctity of the home has been recognized by
the Supreme Court, so too have the benefits and objectives of forfeiture. See Pay-
ton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (“[N]either history nor this Nation’s
experience requires us to disregard the overriding respect for the sanctity of the
home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Repub-
lic.”).  In his address to Parliament, William Pitt, the Earl of Chatham, stated:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown.  It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it;
the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot
enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!
Id. at 602 n.54 (citation omitted); see also Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090,
1094 (2014) (explaining the societal benefits of forfeiture, although in the context
of a criminal in personam forfeiture); James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at
53–54 (“[Property owner]’s right to maintain control over his home, and to be
free from governmental interference, is a private interest of historic and continu-
ing importance.” (citations omitted)); Stefan D. Cassella, The Case for Civil Forfei-
ture: Why In Rem Proceedings Are an Essential Tool for Recovering the Proceeds of Crime, 11
J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 8, 10–14 (2008) (describing instances in which
civil forfeiture is valuable to law enforcement and society at large).
156. See Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1094 (“Forfeitures help to ensure that crime does
not pay: They at once punish wrongdoing, deter future illegality, and lessen the
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forfeiture, it is not only the wrongdoer who is punished.157  Likewise, the
goal of deterring drug-related activity is not necessarily achieved in cases
of residential civil forfeiture because substance-abuse is highly prevalent
among homeless and housing insecure populations.158  Lessening the eco-
nomic power of criminal enterprises—another purported benefit of forfei-
ture—is also unavailing in light of the small-scale nature of underlying
offenses in most civil forfeitures; such activities can take place at a number
of venues, and the seizure of one of these will not prevent an individual
from conducting such transactions in other private or public places.159
Yet another objective of forfeiture that civil in rem forfeiture does not
accomplish is victim compensation, because unlike criminal forfeitures,
which are often used for restitution, the entirety of proceeds from civil
forfeitures in Pennsylvania are allocated to the district attorney to be used
for the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act.160  Although the
attorney general is authorized by statute to divert these funds to commu-
nity-based crime fighting, the state’s recent forfeiture reports indicate that
exactly zero funds have been expended on these efforts.161  Therefore,
while civil forfeiture could conceivably improve conditions in crime-dam-
aged communities, its actual implementation in Philadelphia does not ac-
complish this end.162
economic power of criminal enterprises.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
157. See Cassella, supra note 155, at 13 (arguing that civil forfeiture is particu-
larly beneficial in cases where property sought to be forfeited belongs to third
party).  The very fact that civil forfeiture is considered a useful tool in seizing the
property of a third party to a crime belies this objective. See id.
158. See Thomas P. O’Toole et al., Self-Reported Changes in Drug and Alcohol Use
After Becoming Homeless, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 830, 832 (2004) (explaining that
study conducted among homeless individuals living in Philadelphia reported 83%
of respondents screened positive for substance abuse or dependence).
159. See, e.g., United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 737–38
(C.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that home was not integral to its occupant’s drug posses-
sion or transactions because property was “nothing more than a place at which
drugs were sold,” and there was no additional link between commission of crime
and home).
160. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5803(i) (West 2018) (authoriz-
ing Attorney General to allocate funds to district attorney, and allowing “[i]n ap-
propriate cases” Attorney General to designate proceeds to be used to utilize
community-based drug and crime-fighting methods or to transfer property to non-
profit organizations to alleviate blight).
161. See KANE, supra note 10, at 53 (indicating that “$0.00” was expended on
“Community Based Drug & Crime Fighting Programs” from “$2,203,272.00” in in-
come obtained from forfeitures in Philadelphia County during fiscal year
2014–15); COMMW. OF PA., OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 10 (indicating that
“$0.00” was expended on “Community Based Drug & Crime Fighting Programs”
from income obtained from forfeitures in Philadelphia County during fiscal years
2007–10).
162. See INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 7 (explaining that in Philadelphia, “be-
tween 2011 and 2013 half of the cases [of civil forfeiture] involved less than $192”);
Isaiah Thompson, Law to Clean up “Nuisances” Costs Innocent People Their Homes,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 5, 2013, 06:39 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/law-to-
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Likewise, the traditional justifications of civil in rem forfeiture are in-
applicable to civil forfeitures of primary residences.163  Drug-related
crimes that spur forfeitures of family homes are by and large purely do-
mestic matters easily punishable by criminal fines and penalties, unlike
crimes in which the perpetrator is outside the court’s jurisdiction, render-
ing in personam jurisdiction impossible or impractical.164  Therefore, im-
posing a presumption of excessiveness in cases of residential forfeiture
would not undermine the utility or purpose of civil in rem forfeiture.165
VI. CONCLUSION: FATE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP LEFT TO
COURTS’ DISCRETION
Homeownership provides individuals and families with security,
safety, and wealth.166  Among low-income communities, these benefits are
unknown to a growing percent of the population experiencing homeless-
ness.167  To make matters worse, these same communities are targeted
clean-up-nuisances-costs-innocent-people-their-homes [https://perma.cc/J45Q-
ADF5] (conveying criticism that financial incentives for law enforcement cause “of-
ficials to over-emphasize drug prosecutions at the expense of other crime-
fighting”).
163. See United States v. Leonard, 137 S. Ct. 847, 849 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (contrasting modern implementation of civil forfeiture from histori-
cal practice).  In expressing his skepticism of civil asset forfeiture’s constitutional-
ity, Justice Thomas stated:
First, historical forfeiture laws were narrower in most respects than mod-
ern ones.  Most obviously, they were limited to a few specific subject mat-
ters, such as customs and piracy.  Proceeding in rem in those cases was
often justified by necessity, because the party responsible for the crime
was frequently located overseas and thus beyond the personal jurisdiction
of United States courts.
Id. (citations omitted).
164. Cf. Cassella, supra note 155, at 13–18 (providing examples of modern
crimes that present jurisdictional difficulties which can be remedied by civil in rem
forfeiture).  Such instances include those in which the defendant is deceased. See
id.; see also United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (dis-
missing indictment of individual found guilty of wire, securities, and bank fraud,
and denying victim’s request for restitution where perpetrator passed away two
months after verdict was rendered).  Another scenario prompting civil forfeiture is
where the wrongdoer is unknown, for example, when a courier is found in posses-
sion of criminal proceeds. See Cassella, supra note 155, at 14–15.  Likewise, civil
forfeiture is appropriate where the accused is a fugitive, and thus outside of the
courts’ jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. $671,160.00 in United States Cur-
rency, 730 F.3d 1051, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2013) (dismissing Canadian citizen’s claim
to seized property in civil forfeiture action where he deliberately avoided prosecu-
tion by leaving country, thus fitting statutory definition of fugitive under Fugitive
Disentitlement Statute).
165. See Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 849 (opining that the historical pedigree of civil
forfeiture is not capable of upholding the constitutionality of its modern
implementation).
166. See, e.g., BOEHM & SCHLOTTMANN, supra note 141, at 1 (stating that homes
are main, if not only, source of wealth among most low-income families).
167. See generally Paisner, supra note 144, at 6–8 (providing overview of charac-
teristics of homeless population).
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most heavily by civil asset forfeiture practices, leaving those fortunate
enough to own homes especially vulnerable.168  Accordingly, these factors,
along with the longstanding notion that homes are sanctified places,
should be at the forefront of a court’s decision as to whether permanently
removing an individual or family from its home constitutes an excessive
fine under the Eighth Amendment.169
Certainly, some modifications the 1997 Chevrolet court made to civil
forfeiture adjudication represent small victories for Pennsylvania home-
owners.170  Nevertheless, the court missed an opportunity to give proper
weight to the long-recognized principle that the home is a place like no
other and should enjoy the utmost protection.171  Although some are
hopeful that the passing of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 8 will achieve this end,
states that have implemented similar civil forfeiture reforms continue to
seize guilty property.172  Likewise, Philadelphia’s potential class-action set-
168. See ACLU, supra note 9, at 3 (mapping concentration of civil forfeiture in
Philadelphia).  This map illustrates that cash in rem forfeitures are highly concen-
trated in North Philadelphia neighborhoods. See id.
169. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (“Preserving the sanc-
tity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape
from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value.”); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (“The home derives its pre-emi-
nence as the seat of family life.  And the integrity of that life is something so
fundamental that it has been found to draw its protection the principles of more
than one explicitly granted Constitutional right.”); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 394 (1914) (acknowledging the “sanctity of [a person’s] home” in the
context of Fourth Amendment searches); see also Barros, supra note 147, at 281
(describing the collateral effects of forced relocation, including “significant nega-
tive psychological impacts”).
170. See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized from James
Young, 160 A.3d 153, 192 (Pa. 2017) (mandating courts to consider the subjective
value of the home, the harm forfeiture would bring to third parties, and whether
the forfeiture would deprive the owner of his or her livelihood).
171. See John Adams, Adams’ Minutes of the Review, King vs. Stewart (July 1774),
reprinted in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS (Mass. Hist. Soc’y eds., 2018), https://
www.masshist.org/publications/apde2/view?id=ADMS-05-01-02-0003-0002-0014
[https://perma.cc/Q8G4-A58U] (“An Englishmans dwelling House is his Castle.
The law has erected a Fortification round it . . . to deprive a Man of this Protection
. . . is treat[ing] him not like an Englishman not like a Freeman but like a
Slave. . . .”); see also Barros, supra note 147, at 256 (remarking that in addition to
Fourth Amendment protections of homes, federal tax code, post-foreclosure rights
of redemption, and just cause eviction laws are examples of favorable legal treat-
ment homes receive); supra note 169 and accompanying text for specific state-
ments made by the Supreme Court on the sanctity of homeownership.
172. See 2017 Pa. Laws 247 (codified as amended at 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5805(j)(3)) (holding Commonwealth to clear and convincing standard of
proof); see also David Pimental, Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: A Practical Ap-
proach to the Excessive Fines Clause as a Check on Government Seizures, 11 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 541, 542 (2017) (highlighting that forfeiture persists even in states
whose forfeiture legislation purported to end practice, like Montana and New
Mexico); Midge Carter, To Think That SB 8 Becoming Law will Effectively Reform Civil
Asset Forfeiture is Naı¨ve, ACLU OF PA. (July 21, 2017), https://blog.aclupa.org/
2017/07/21/to-think-that-sb-8-becoming-law-will-effectively-reform-civil-asset-for-
feiture-is-naive/ [https://perma.cc/9B57-F527] (arguing that due to weakened
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tlement, which would do away with the current scheme of giving proceeds
to the district attorney’s office, and election of progressive district attorney
Larry Krasner will not effectuate a categorical protection for homeowners
across the state.173  Until the courts adopt a presumption of excessiveness
in cases of home forfeiture, the notion that the home deserves special pro-
tection under law will remain but a truism, unrealized by swaths of the
public.174
provisions and absence of right to counsel, Senate Bill 8 is unlikely to have impact
necessary on Pennsylvania civil forfeiture practices).
173. See Defendant’s Motion for Entry of Permanent Injunction at 2, Sourove-
lis v. City of Phila. (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2017) (No. 14-14687) (denying liability as to
the violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights but seeking a “permanent injunction
enjoining Defendants from retaining forfeited property and its proceeds for use by
the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office and the Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment”); see also Plaintiff’s Response to and Request to Hold in Abeyance Defen-
dant’s Motion for a Permanent Injunction at 3, Sourovelis v. City of Phila. (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 4, 2017) (No. 14-14687) (urging court to reject Defendant Philadelphia’s at-
tempt to obtain injunction, citing the fact that Plaintiffs are also seeking “retro-
spective relief in the form of a declaration that their constitutional rights were
violated, nominal damages, and restitution”); Order, Sourovelis v. City of Phila.
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2017) (No. 14-14687) (placing suit “in suspense pending the
parties’ settlement negotiations and the appointment of a mediator”).  The class
action at issue was brought by attorneys at the Institute for Justice on behalf of
Philadelphia residents whose property was seized by the City. See INST. FOR JUSTICE,
supra note 9 (explaining class-action law suit brought by Philadelphia residents
against city government).  For an overview of District Attorney Krasner’s civil for-
feiture reform goals, see generally KRASNER FOR DIST. ATT’Y, https://kras-
nerforda.com/platform [https://perma.cc/7ZDU-GPRM] (last visited Mar. 22,
2018).
174. See generally Raymond H. Brescia, Sheltering Counsel: Towards a Right to a
Lawyer in Eviction Proceedings, 25 TOURO L. REV. 187, 207 (2009) (describing risk of
homelessness among those facing eviction proceedings).
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